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Hydraulic Fracturing and Federalism: How Regional Needs Should Drive Regulatory 
Oversight, with Texas as Case Study 
by 
Scott Moorhead, MA  
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
SUPERVISOR: Charles Groat 
Hydraulic fracturing of shale has combined traditional oil and gas industry techniques to create 
significant new reserves in the United States.  Poor science, incomplete media coverage and 
politicization of the issues threaten broad understanding of issues of genuine concern while 
overstating others. The Environmental Protection Agency should focus on science-based 
regulation prior to enumerating new rules and should continue to cede primacy to the states 
where traditional regimes have proven successful in regulating oil and gas.   The most critical 
issues associated with hydraulic fracturing tend to be regional and predicated on local 
hydrogeology.  Surface water disposal and emissions standards need revision and 
strengthening.  Scarce resources should be dedicated to better understanding regional water 
availability and to heightened awareness of the energy-water nexus.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background Issues 
Culling recent reports on hydraulic fracturing, the seminal conclusion is the 
discussion of how to safely harness the technology has been misguided at best and 
disingenuously false at worst.  Though controversies surrounding hydraulic fracturing  
for shale gas and oil (also “fracking,” “fraccing,” “fracing” or “HF”) have centered on 
concerns like water contamination, water use and seismicity issues, to name a few 
flashpoints, our understanding of the science and technology is far more mature than 
popular reports might suggest.  Lesser-known issues such as implications of widespread 
water use may be early-stage, based on disparate data that has yet to be studied 
holistically. Reanimation over federal and state sovereignty in recent years, evidenced 
by the rise of the Tea Party and manifest in movements like Occupy Wall Street, has also 
found an updated poster child:  fracking is an ideal proxy for ideological disagreements 
over sovereignty and the modern-day meaning of federalism.   Though “primacy” issues 
are not new fights, particularly in the hydrocarbon industry, fracking appears to have 
touched a nerve. Some consider it to be an appropriate successor in the line of great 
innovation in domestic fossil fuel production.  Others view it as a last grasp at 
hegemony by an industry whose causal ties to anthropogenic climate change are 
unacceptable.  Still another contingent may see fracking combined with directional 
drilling as the means to the last great hope for compromise between scalability and 
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environmental sustainability, a means to domestic fuels that will aid in protecting our 
security interests while bridging to cleaner energy.  Finally, a far more familiar incentive 
is in play: domestic oil and gas reserves are suddenly plentiful once more, and a great 
deal of money is at stake.   
 
Figure 1.1. A well mid-frac.  There is another vertical well roughly 20 feet out of frame to the 
right, emphasizing the significance of the breakthrough of directional drilling: the production 
team is able to consolidate equipment, materials and personnel in a relatively small area and 
simply migrate from one pad to another.  The lateral wells deep below will then spread out in 
different directions, allowing the producer to have several miles of horizontal wells from just a 
couple of vertical entries, greatly reducing the surface footprint of the operation.  Photo by 
author. 
 
At Congress’ behest, the EPA (among other regulatory bodies) is in the process of 
a large-scale data collection and study centered on the exploration industry with a 
principal aim to “elucidate the relationship, if any, between hydraulic fracturing and 
drinking water resources”, but will only release preliminary data later in 2012, with a 
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full report expected in 2014 (though the study outline was released in November 2011, 
behind schedule, which may portend delays on deliverable dates). The endeavor will be 
a collaborative effort, aided by the Department of Energy, the US Geological Survey, the 
US Army Corps of Engineers and the Pennsylvania Geological Survey.  In an election 
year, there will be considerable pressure from the White House to blunt or delay any 
findings that could complicate the electoral landscape, particularly because negative 
findings could have consequences for several swing states that are critical for the Obama 
reelection (Pennsylvania, Colorado, Ohio, and to a lesser extent, Virginia, to name a 
few). 
Currently, much of the best data is scattered across industry or buried in local  
and state levels.  There is little formal apparatus in place to aide large-scale assembly 
and evaluation (Nicot 2012).  To boot, industry is often suspicious of any oversight, 
much less at the federal level, and is still in the process of understanding the resource 
considerations involved in the explosion of shale gas.  In other words, the big picture 
with respect to water availability, water use and other concerns is still coming into focus.  
A core misconception tends to be that those directly involved in exploration have a static 
and complete understanding of all peripheral considerations attendant to practices.  
They do not.  Like any nascent industry, best and most efficient practices evolve over 
time.  Put another way, real-time practices are imperfect.  They then get evaluated, 
codified, or changed according to whether the economics work.  Like any operation 
where hourly costs runs upwards of $40,000 per hour for rig time (Moorhead site visit), 
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activity stoppages cause huge financial losses, which makes calibration in real time 
potentially costly.  For this reason, significant additional research is needed, and yet the 
local, state and federal agencies charged with understanding and regulating the core 
issues remain underfunded.  Simultaneously, these agencies operate under doubts from 
all sides that findings will be appropriate, either biased toward industry or 
environmentalists.   
1.2 Study aims 
The aim of this study is to focus on core issues: 1) to briefly review potential dangers 
associated with hydraulic fracturing; 2) to show how risks are properly and adequately 
addressed by the existing regulatory framework between the states and the federal 
government; 3) to discuss the sovereignty issues currently at the forefront of the 
discussion; and 4) to direct attention toward more compelling issues like local water 
availability.  I argue that the nature of the industry and the potential hazards attendant 
to fracking suggest local regulation is superior to broad federal-driven oversight, with a 
couple of key exceptions.  Broadly speaking, however, today’s science does not indicate 
that recent innovations have exceeded the bandwidth of existing regulatory regimes or 




Chapter Two: Concerns over hydraulic fracturing 
2.1 Lack of Vocabulary Impedes Progress 
The ease of distributing uncorroborated, unsubstantiated data via modern media 
has plagued public understanding of fracking from the outset.  Industry, the public 
good, and government attempts at oversight alike have suffered.  Even now, no 
commonly accepted definition for “fracking” has steadfastly emerged.  Pains to 
differentiate hydraulic fracturing of gas and oil plays (a “play” is an industry term that 
describes a potentially hydrocarbon-rich zone) are uncommon, and “fracking” as often 
indicates the actual fracturing of the rock as it does the cradle-to-grave process of 
drilling, casing, hydraulic fracturing, retrieval and waste disposal (or some combination 
thereof), leading many to make the seemingly basic point to distinguish production 
from the actual frac process (Buchele 2011). Similar instances of confusion have attended 
a number of terms of art that are widespread in the petroengineering industry, but 
unfamiliar to hydrologists and water managers—and vice versa.  Clarity is of utmost 
import, as experts of all kinds seek complete data on hot button issues like hydrological 
accounting, wastewater disposal and groundwater contamination.  Simple measures like 
common language and a full understanding of the process, combined with more robust 
data like background logs, water use data, chemical disclosure and other means will go 
a long way toward solving these issues.  Without a common parlance, mistakes and 
misconceptions are inevitable and will be very costly.  It is already acknowledged that 
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the lack of shared knowledge is thwarting the pace of development and technology 
transfer (Stone 2012).  
2.2 Growth of Industry 
The idiomatic muddle emerges because industry growth since 2006 or so has 
been simply astounding.  The US Energy Information Administration reports that 
recoverable gas resources have doubled in 2011 alone, and that by 2035, 45% of our 
nation’s natural gas will come from shale gas extraction made possible by HF (Figure 
2.2). 
  
Figure 2.2  Projected natural gas production from the US, 1990-2035.  Hydraulic fracturing 





Such rapid growth causes gaps in shared knowledge, and also brings together 
disciplines and their practitioners in new and sometimes unforeseen ways.  During the 
author’s site visit to a drilling operation at an Eagle Ford oil and gas lease, several water 
managers spoke with one of the crew overseeing a ten-day frack job.  Talk turned to 
water scarcity and the need for recycling, but managers and oil hands could reach no 
consensus on a definition on brackish groundwater; that is, their total dissolved solids 
(TDS) counts were distinctly different.  One person’s brine was another person’s 
brackish (and potentially usable) source, again underscoring the need for a lingua franca. 
Greater information exchange across disciplines will mitigate the problem, as water 
recycling becomes more commonplace and water managers become increasingly 
familiar with volumes necessary for energy exploration and development. 
Because of technical and geological variations regionally and even within a given 
play, imprecise labeling of different parts of the process exposes regulatory agencies and 
the public in a negative way.  Stakeholders may concentrate on parts of the process 
where know-how is already mature, while ignoring or underemphasizing more 
immediate concerns that are more deserving of scrutiny.   
2.3 EPA Intervention 
Recent EPA findings and subsequent media attention bears this out. On 
December 8, 2011, the EPA made public the linkage between hydraulic fracturing and 
groundwater contamination at Pavillion near Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Critical headlines 
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decried the link between hydraulic fracturing and groundwater contamination, while 
the actual report suggests that the frac process had no bearing on the water, and 
practices at the site were unorthodox and distinctly different than shale plays in Texas, 
Pennsylvania and New York (Fuel Fix January 13, 2012). It is alleged to be the first 
documented instance in which groundwater contamination occurred as a direct result of 
the hydraulic fracturing process itself, rather than subsequent disposal of water or 
storage of water.  Many details of the case were unusual, however, not only because 
they reveal significant potential negligence by the exploration company (who happens 
to be Canadian), but also because they reflect practices that are not widespread—
shallow vertical fracturing in a sand aquifer, for example, and storage of flowback in 
unprotected reservoirs near water wells.  While evidence may suggest malfeasance, a 
kneejerk reaction without contextualizing the issue will be costly for industry, 
policymakers and consumers. 
There is no better example of taking premature action without corroborating 
science than the Range Resources case that unfolded over the last year near Dallas, 
Texas.  In late 2010, EPA’s Region Six office, acting under auspices of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA), issued an emergency order to Range Resources to halt frac 
operations in the Barnett Shale in Parker County, Texas.  Citing a local landowner’s 
concern that the nearby frac operations had contaminated his well water with methane, 
and in direct opposition to the state Railroad Commission, who had reviewed the 
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technical data and found no evidence of contamination as a result of the fracking 
operation, EPA sustained a 15-month-long emergency order.  Technical data reviewed 
by multiple experts showed that methane found in the homeowner’s well was methane 
from a shallower formation that had not been perforated by Range (Kreitler 2011, Riley 
2011).  In a telling maneuver, EPA quietly lifted the emergency order late Friday on 
March 30, 2012, indicating it also concluded that no contamination had occurred.  
Though EPA made no admission of a reversal as to the source of the thermogenic gas, 
Friday press releases are commonplace when trying to blunt potential media attention.  
Range has agreed to sample water for the next year at twenty private wells near the site 
(Schlacter 2012).  The episode was a stark reminder that politicizing these issues from 
any angle prior to discovery of strong science and a broad understanding of the industry 
will be a mistake. The current rift between EPA and industry can be attributed in large 
part to a true lack of coordination and communication between the agency and industry 
leaders.  There has been far too little shared discourse between parties to expect strong 
information sharing to have emerged to date.   
2.4 Contamination Concerns 
To date, no studies exist to tie the process of hydraulic fracturing to groundwater 
contamination.  Rather, contamination issues appear to involve the more traditional 
parts of the production process that are commonplace in oil and gas exploration, such as 
well casing, flowback control, and disposal of wastewater.  Former Pennsylvania 
10 
 
Department of Environmental Protection Secretary John Hanger recently gave an 
interview in the New York Post:    
Prior to the Marcellus [exploitation], there have probably been 50 to 150 
private water wells, out of more than a million in the state, that have had 
methane contamination as a result of mistakes in the drilling process — 
but that has nothing to do with fracking…Some in the industry deny that 
it ever happens, and that is false... But frack fluids returning from depth, 
from 5,000 to 8,000 feet under the ground, to contaminate an aquifer? 
When the industry says that’s never happened, that has in fact never 
happened. And fracking has had no impact on the public water supply. 
      (Williamson 2012) 
2.4.1 Compelling physical constraints suggest local control 
Physics and rock dynamics suggest that fracking in deep shale is so geologically 
isolated from shallow aquifers that it is impossible to surmise that fracking fluid could 
migrate from deep laterals through several thousand feet of effectively impermeable 










Figure 2.4. Schematic of a fracked well and adjacent water well.  Not to scale.  Source: Source: US 
Department of Energy, Fossil Energy Web, 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/images/programs/oilgas/hydraulic_fracturing_large.jpg 
 
An emerging consensus believes that the critical avenues for environmental 
problems largely arise at the surface, where transportation and storage of flowback, 
heavy traffic, emissions levels and other sorts of activity-related issues can arise (Groat 
2012).  These are critical acknowledgements because these sorts of activities are already 
heavily and predictably regulated in the traditional oil and gas industry through 
existing agreements between states and the EPA.  The novelty of the shale gas boom lies 
in the sheer magnitude of activity and the unavoidable pressures that the volume has 
created: in terms of trucks on the road, rigs in use, water volumes injected and returned 
to the surface, for example.  It is not so much that new issues demand new regulation as 
much as there is more and more activity of a familiar kind that must be monitored.   
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Contaminated flowback waters and emissions leap out as areas where EPA may 
have a strong interest.  Yet local geology is a critical factor in wastewater disposal 
because it circumscribes the method of disposal.  For this reason, practices like surface 
water disposal have traditionally been more common in the Marcellus play in 
Pennsylvania and New York than in places like Texas, where geologies permit the 
hydraulic isolation needed for deep well injection.  Importantly, flowback and 
wastewater disposal have been a concern for industry and regulators long before the 
advent of widespread HF, and so mechanisms to govern these practices have been in 
place for decades.  The degree to which geology and hydrogeology can vary from locale 
to locale suggests that regulatory regimes should continue to place a premium on 
flexibility.   
Flowback rates offer a strong example.  In the Eagle Ford Shale, flowback rates 
are only up to 10% at a given well (Moorhead, Ely) commensurate with a DOE-based 
report that the Eagle Ford recovery rate is “almost no(ne)” compared to the Marcellus 
Shale, where flowback volumes range from 20-40% of the injected volume. (SEAB 
ninety-day report).  Nevertheless, estimates vary widely and are region-specific, 
yielding ranges of 15-80% in some reports (Rahm 2011), suggesting that more detailed 
regional studies are necessary to truly understand nuances among locales.  Nevertheless, 
the wide fluctuation in flowback alters disposal and availability needs from place to 
place; grossly, there is a lesser need for flowback disposal on a per well basis in the 
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Eagle Ford than in the Marcellus, for example, so best practices will vary.  Recycling is 
comparatively less important in the Eagle Ford than is water availability, and safe 




Chapter Three: The Existing Regulatory Regime: States Have Primacy 
3.1 Purpose of regulation 
A presumed aim of regulation is to exact a civic protection sufficient to defend 
the public health and good while maintaining this barrier at the lowest cost to 
producers, society and government; in other words, to optimize benefits while 
minimizing costs, and our politics are presumably constructed around how and through 
whom to achieve these aims.  A subsequent question concerns the proper level of 
government need to achieve that optimization under constitutional grounds, while 
ensuring that no level of government assumes oversight beyond the point it can 
reasonably and economically enact its role to create and enforce policy.  In the energy 
industry especially, balancing these demands can be vexing.  Part of the vexation stems 
from the sheer volume of producers and the complexity of upstream and downstream 
operations.  Significant, comprehensive data collection is an expensive and time 
consuming task.   
3.2 EPA Oversight 
The existing apparatus for dealing with the more salient issues that could 
threaten groundwater—well casing, deep well injection--are largely already in place, 
with some key exceptions. The aforementioned apparatus centers on the balance of 




3.2.1 UIC Program  
Under the EPA’s underground injection control (UIC) program, state UIC 
programs have primary regulatory and enforcement authority once those programs 
have received EPA approval (EPA UIC Primacy).  States may apply for primacy dealing 
with parts or all of their respective waste injection programs, which are defined by EPA, 
and if states do not meet requirements, or elect to turn over control to EPA, one of the 
EPA’s ten regional offices assumes responsibility.  Ten states currently cede all injection 
oversight to the EPA, while seven more share joint responsibility.  The remaining 
majority have adopted and enacted their own EPA-approved state programs (figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2. EPA UIC Primacy.  EPA has delegated primacy for all wastewater injection well 
classes to 33 states and 3 territories; it shares responsibility with 7 states (i.e., EPA has authority 





Discussion of EPA involvement in hydraulic fracturing requires, once again, 
precision of nomenclature.  EPA intervention in the early stages of the actual fracking 
seems unnecessary, though there is some thought that EPA may create broad rules for 
constituent disclosure.  The available avenues to do so vary in legal strength and scope.  
3.2.2 History of EPA Involvement  
As far back as 1997, EPA was urged to regulate fracking fluids under Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA).  At the US Court of Appeals’ behest, EPA conducted a 
study of hydraulic fracturing in coal bed methane that yielded a 2004 decision to abstain 
from regulating the practice, and further exempted the technique from future study 
(Rahm 2011).  The National Energy Policy Act of 2005 then expressly exempted HF from 
regulation, in spite of opposition.  Commonly known as the “Halliburton loophole,” the 
exemption does not allow EPA oversight of injection of “the underground injection of 
fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing 
operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities” (though wells using 
diesel fuel must be permitted).   Per the regulation, “state oil and gas agencies may have 
additional regulations for hydraulic fracturing.  (EPA Web, About EPA: What we do)   
3.2.3 Constituent Disclosure  
Many states do have disclosure rules in place. It is virtually certain that more 
states will pass rules and/or laws in the near future.  Some of the urgency is attributable 
to a maturing understanding of potential hazards, and some is due to industry and state 
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alarm that best practices should be established locally to obviate the need for EPA to 
intervene.  According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, by mid-summer 
2011, eight states had already considered legislation to require disclosure of fracking 
fluids.  Though Texas is among the only states to have disclosure language written by 
statute (others have state regulations), others, like Wyoming, also boast formidable 
databases to track things like background chemistry (Engle interview).  The Texas law 
requires drillers to publicly post hydraulic fracturing fluid constituents, though it does 
allow them to withhold limited information that would presumably place them at a 
competitive disadvantage.  The law is quite similar to those in other states, which reflect 
a general insistence on disclosure, though some proposals have come under fire for 
allowing industry to withhold even a small amount of information, or for only 
disclosing certain formulae to regulatory agencies or first responders.  On February 1, 
2012, the Texas law went into effect.  Wells in operation before February 1, 2012 remain 
under voluntary disclosure; only wells with an initial drilling permit after February 1, 
2012 will have to disclose on a public website called FracFocus (StateImpact Dec 16, 
2011) (Figure 3.2a). 
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Figure 3.2a  Screen Grab from www.fracfocus.org  website. The website is searchable by different 
fields; the shot above shows well concentrations in Texas.  The zoom feature on the left side of the 
screen allows the user to more precisely define the geographic window of search.  User can also 
search by well number, county, well name or operator, among other fields.  Photo by author. 
 
 
FracFocus also features some Bureau of Land Management (BLM) wells on 
Federally-held lands; this is a recent development initiated by Secretary of the Interior 
Ken Salazar.  Though EPA has yet to formally engage on this issue, there seem to be 
pressure points.  The BTEX compounds sometimes used in fracking—benzene, toluene, 
xylene and ethylbenzene—are subject to regulation under SDWA and CAA, and were a 
major focus of the Waxman Committee Report, which many regard as the most focused 
and comprehensive effort to date to disclose possible frack fluid constituents (Waxman 
2011, Groat et al 2012). 
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Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), EPA may intercede in other areas of fracking 
operations, albeit indirectly, requiring storm water management plans (SWMPs) to 
regulate water quality at sites during periods of heavy precipitation (Groat 2012).  More 
directly, under primacy laws, states and/or EPA retain authority under CWA to regulate 
surface discharge of produced waters from hydraulic fracturing operations under the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program (EPA 
Natural Gas Extraction Web).  Discharge into class II injection wells allows states to 
discharge of the produced waters according to their EPA-approved state UIC program 
(figure 3.2b).   These programs are sanctioned under SDWA with the explicit goal of 
protecting underground drinking water sources (USDWs), which include any waters of 
less than 10,000 TDS (EPA Web Guidance for determination). The UIC program is over 
thirty years old and benefits from third-party mediators like the groundwater protection 
council, a national association of state groundwater agencies who assists EPA with 









Figure 3.2b. A Class II Injection well. Source: TX RR Commission Web, 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about/faqs/images/injectionwelllg.jpg 
 
Surface water disposal is critically different from deep well injection, generally 
speaking, because the water is not effectively removed from the hydrologic cycle, and 
because the existing laws, written before the frack boom, have proven insufficient. 
Historically, those states with surface water disposal needs have been slow to adopt 
efficacious means of treatment.  The most high-profile of these is Pennsylvania.  Early in 
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the shale boom, produced flowback was frequently disposed of in Pennsylvania’s 
surface waterways and processed by wastewater treatment plants. These disposals were 
likely legal under NPDES, which requires that prior to surface disposal effluent is 
treated prior to disposal.  Problematically, however, these wastewater facilities lack the 
infrastructure to properly remove heavy metals, NORMS, and other compounds used 
for the frack or found naturally in formation.    Interestingly, Pennsylvania is one of the 
seven states whose disposal program has been ceded entirely to EPA (figure 2). 
Despite its legality, surface disposal is growing less common. Producers in the 
Marcellus have moved away from surface water disposal in favor of transporting 
produced waters to states like Ohio, where deep well injection is more common.  
Though its practice is diminishing, and despite collaborations between industry and 
state regulators on recycling programs and treatment plans, the reality is that the 
potential cross-state impact via surface water systems, i.e. the Chesapeake Bay estuary, 
makes this a major issue for EPA.  More stringent requirements for flowback water 
processing prior to surface disposal would be the most basic prerequisite for bolstering 
regulations.  Whether this appears in more stringent recycling requirements, additional 
treatment to remove constituents added during the frack or an outright ban on surface 
water disposals remains to be seen.  In any case, surface disposal of flowback appears to 
be one of the key areas where EPA can and should more greatly restrict activities; it is 
key to point out, however, that in so doing there would be no need to upend the 
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primacy model.  Rather, more stringent regulations can be imposed that would still 
allow states to institute equally or more rigorous requirements.  This allows states with 
mature deep well injection programs to continue with practices that history 
demonstrates are safe, while requiring those states with less mature industries to 
advance safe practices under the guiding hand of an EPA stipulation. 
3.3 Approach to oversight 
The argument for more rigorous oversight by the EPA is centered on the same 
principles that suggest its involvement need be comprehensive but moderated: namely, 
that there is extraordinary disparity between the states in terms of the maturity of the 
industry and the subsequent sophistication of regulatory regimes charged with local 
oversight.  Shale gas is currently produced in 22 of the 50 states (Nicot 2012). States with 
long-standing oil and gas industries, like Texas, have developed methods and expertise 
that put them at the fore of the oil and gas frontier.  History-rich states like Texas are 
highly concerned that networks that took generations to create—whether between 
industry and communities or industry and regulators—will be undermined by federal 
intervention pinned to standards that don’t quite map onto local practices.  Arguments 
that standards will be unnecessarily rigid or complex, and predicated on realities that 
occur elsewhere, are common.   
 
3.3.1 Industry-regulatory conflicts  
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A common rebuttal is that state regulatory authorities in traditional oil and gas 
producing states have become too cozy with industry.  There is merit to this counter.   
For one, conflicts of interest may predominate where regulators and industry have 
extended histories.   Significant concerns arose in the aftermath of the Macondo 
Deepwater Horizon tragedy, suggesting that officials charged with oversight were 
overly friendly with the subjects of their reviews and that some shared relationships 
were overly and overtly transactional.  These same kinds of charges have been leveled at 
institutions such as Texas’ Railroad Commission and The Texas Commission of 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), who bears responsibility for water quality parameters 
and pollution control. (Railroad Commission Web).  Ultimately, however, there must be 
discourse and familiarity between industry and regulatory regimes regardless of the 
level of oversight.  Cooperation between industry and regulatory authorities should not 
be tantamount to collusion.  Furthermore, it seems unlikely that state level officials are 
somehow more exposed to potential conflicts of interest than federal officials, or that 
either industry or the environmental lobby wields more influence at a local level.  The 
Supreme Court decision Citizens United, which made corporate donations to political 
action committees (PACs) legal (whereas before they were limited to paying 
administrative costs of those PACs), has opened the doors for significant contributions 
across federal, state and local elections, but it is unlikely that the federal government is 
less susceptible to corporate influence than a state-level agency.  It is important to 
recognize that the EPA is appointment-based, as are many state regulatory authorities—
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but the presumption that political donations do not have the power to influence 
government at any level- directly or indirectly is naïve at best.  Furthermore, the 
variability among state governments and regulatory authorities—in effect, the presence 
of a state-by-state system of rules and regulations—may raise the costs of influence for 
interest groups because no two set of rules are exactly alike, and distributing money 
across several states may be more expensive than spending solely at the federal level in a 
targeted manner.  This is not to say that any of the aforementioned actors are responsive 
to dollars, but rather that there does not seem to be a cogent argument that local regimes 
are more vulnerable to influence than larger ones. 
Interestingly, there is some evidence suggesting that federally-led environmental 
policy and state-level enforcement may result in counterproductive results.  A study 
conducted by Konisky (2009) found mixed effects, showing that state enforcement 
actually fell in the years after federal implementation of conservation and environmental 
justice legislation such as the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, and others.  Rather, the data suggest officials may have muted or amplified 
enforcement actions to respond to changing economics at localized levels, i.e. within a 
county.  His work found that states often targeted enforcement actions in higher poverty 
areas, but also decreased with rising unemployment, and there was no evidence to 
suggest that enforcement rose in areas with large poor, black or Hispanic populations 
(Konisky 2009).  Surely the results are mixed and the mechanisms by which policy 
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engagements succeed or fail are highly complex, but the work reinforces the notion that 
policy coupled with poor enforcement may result in negative impacts.  It also fuels the 
argument that policymakers should concentrate on prudent encouragement of 
enterprises that foster economic growth within the bounds of environmental 
protectionism; that is, we should reconsider the potential positive impacts of local 
economic growth and whether it necessarily augers potential environmental justice 
issues.  In other words, resource development does not necessarily engender 
environmental conflict. 
Accordingly, a principal argument against increased involvement by EPA hinges 
on the concern that inadequate resources will plague a program of increased regulatory 
structure.  In effect, more stringent rules will be difficult to monitor and enforce, which 
could cause costly delays in review or approvals processes, even for those who are in 
compliance.  Under the EPA burden reduction (BR) initiative, specifically in the 
underground injection control (UIC) program, EPA itself admits that concerns remain 
that the initiative faces enforcement challenges due to funding; further oversight and 
responsibility will be a challenge for an agency already at risk of receiving significantly 




Chapter Four: A Proper Balance 
4.1 Environmental Federalism 
The system of cooperative federalism dominates environmental law in the 
United States; that is, state and federal jurisdictions overlap and share joint, often 
overlapping responsibilities.  Broadly, the founders were rightfully concerned with how 
issues of justice and fairness could be subsumed under the power of the majority.  There 
was and still is a keen recognition that democratic processes do not always lead to the 
most just, fair or healthy outcomes.  “Liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty 
as well as the abuses of power,” James Madison wrote.  The current regulatory regime 
from top to bottom, as well as industry, should remind themselves of this fact. 
4.1.2 Overview of Activism 
Starting in the 1970s, the federal government began to take a far more active role in 
environmental regulation, beginning with the creation of the EPA.  EPA is a cabinet-
ranked agency but is not a cabinet department, meaning it operates somewhat outside 
the sphere of influence of other cabinet departments, and is not in direct competition 
with other cabinet agencies; some argue this “outsider” status has given it greater 
autonomy than other cabinet-level agencies.  Funding has always been an issue 
(Wellborn), even as its mission has expanded.  The personnel and ideological changes in 
the executive branch over three decades have alternately contracted, expanded or 
modified how EPA has worked with the states and business.  Reagan reduced EPA’s 
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authority during his time in office, proposing a laissez faire approach to intervention in 
industry; Bush I and Clinton are seen to have moderated it, giving more authority to the 
states.  For a time, George W. Bush appeared willing to continue this trend, though 
increasingly his policies reverted to a more centralized, federally-driven strategy 
(Huque, Adelman).  These characterizations are known as any number of permutations 
of federalism.  Funding can be fickle: in 2010, EPA funding stood at $10.3 billion—the 
largest in its history.  Just two years later, the FY 2012 budget was $8.973 billion—almost 
$1.4 billion lower (and the enacted level was $8.405B), while President Obama’s 2013 
request was even less, at 8.3B, suggesting the enacted figure will dip still lower.  This is 
due to diminished government revenues but also to backlash against perceived federal 
overreaching.  In response, the president (executive branch) asks for less money (so as 
not to be seen as expanding federal powers) and the legislative body (Congress) 
appeases political constituents by appropriating even less than requested (thus 
appearing to take a hard line against the president).  One cannot underestimate how 
politics can affect regulatory regimes, and one might also surmise that the pendulum 
that swung toward that states under Bush and Clinton is nevertheless swinging back 
toward centralization under W. Bush and Obama.   
4.2 Adaptive federalism v. matching principle 
Macroexamination of these trends suggests a move toward what some call 
“adaptive” or “conjoint” federalism (Powers 2011, Huque 2010) which is sometimes 
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attributed to the interstate commerce clause, which opened the door to federal 
intervention in state issues.  Loosely put, adaptive federalism recommends a dynamic, 
agile exchange between federal and state governments to allow for maximizing 
efficiencies of oversight and cost while ensuring proper environmental protections.  The 
idea serves as counterpoint to the matching principle, which recommends that a 
regulatory response to an environmental issue correlate level of government to the 
geographical magnitude of the problem.  Accordingly, local government would handle 
issues of local concern, like a brownfield site, while the federal government might 
handle something like greenhouse gas emissions, which have cross-boundary impacts.  
As a problem grows in scope, the commensurate level of government intervenes 
accordingly.  Herein, presumably, the regulating entity then fully internalizes the costs 
and benefits of the policy approach.   
Resistance to the matching principle as a proper response hinges on the assertion that 
environmental issues are too complex to cleanly conform to a reductive scale.  Namely, 
ecosystems are complex systems, ill-understood, and subject to laws and consequences 
that defy certain prediction.  Under this reasoning, it is impossible to ably discern the 
limit at which a governmental intervention may have appropriately mitigated negative 
outcomes, so pinpointing a proper government actor is a misguided approach, or worse.  
This rationale sometimes seems to be given as a compelling reason to introduce federal 
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intervention, under the auspices that one needs the largest umbrella possible to mitigate 
issues whose scope is beyond discernment.  
4.3 Race-to-the-bottom  
Adherence to the existing primacy structure between the states and EPA renders 
this concern largely moot.  A common criticism in allowing states to develop distinct 
standards is that an excess laxity in standards could arise locally.  Within a mobile 
industry, states and interest groups will then engage in a “race to the bottom,” to court 
dollars and business, keeping enforcement and costs artificially and dangerously low.  
Such a scenario fails to materialize with most aspects of the hydraulic fracturing process, 
the two critical exceptions being surface water disposals and emissions of volatile 
organic compounds and other greenhouse gases (as they can transcend local boundaries 
or because the costs to transport them to less stringently-monitored states may not be 
prohibitive).  Irrespective of state standards, exploration in the hydrocarbon industry 
follows money, not regulation, and static geology acts as the bank.  Industry will not 
pass up productive leases because regulation is too stringent, and conversely, ease of 
exploration is meaningless if there is not significant oil or gas to be found.  The market is 
driven by cost, and the costs of stringent or lax policy do not significantly affect 
decision-making when companies decided where to drill.  Dr. Stephen Holditch of the 
Texas A&M Petroleum Department, sums it thusly: “little bitty things like (nominal) 
regulations will be overwhelmed by the geology.  If they can’t hit three to four to five 
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times revenues, they wouldn’t drill the well anyway.  (The cost of regulation) is money 
off the bottom line, but it’s not a difference–maker” (Holditch 2012). 
4.4 Potential interventions 
Focusing on EPA’s past behavior is telling with respect to their current position 
and the wisdom of future intervention.  In handling the Range case in Dallas and 
controversies in Dimock, Pennsylvania, and Pavillion, Wyoming, EPA appears to be 
testing the limits of enforcement capabilities based on the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA) and CERCLA.  Some have noted the focus on naturally occurring radioactivity 
(NORMS) in wastewater, whose oversight is currently found at the state level and 
sometimes shared by two regulating authorities, as in Texas (Waeckerlin 2012, Groat 
2012).  The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 8, announced November 23, 2011, also 
may act as a vehicle for disclosure of constituents found in fracking fluid.  EPA has 
accepted parts of a petition from the Watchdog group EarthJustice, saying there is 
“value in initiating a proposed rulemaking process using TSCA authorities to obtain 
data on chemical substances and mixtures used in hydraulic fracturing” (Serebrin 2011). 
EPA also appears steeled to alter course from a policy of allowing voluntary disclosure 
by industry as a means of data provision and compliance.  Past programs centered on 
voluntary disclosure have come under fire because of reporting biases.  For example, 
EPA has long maintained an interest in a comprehensive coal ash disposal program, 
dating to the late 1970’s.  In recent years, in trying to formulate best practices and/or 
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regulations, EPA has queried industry for data on the use of safeguards such as landfill 
liners to prevent groundwater leachate.  Incomplete survey results, in addition to low 
response numbers, also suggest bias because respondents were more likely to employ 
best practices, offering a false impression of the scope of practices (EPA Hazardous and 
Solid Waste Rule).  Such criticisms animate the argument that oversight of best practices 
requires more localized intervention—boots closer to, if not on, the ground.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance has 
issued its draft guidance on the Fiscal Year 2013 enforcement program, and intends to 
“significantly cut back traditional federal enforcement strategies across all major federal 
environmental programs, and to eliminate the voluntary disclosure program long relied 
upon by industry to disclose violations discovered during compliance audits” (OECA 
2012).  A key question, of course, is how, or whether, it will fill the presumed regulatory 
vacuum. 
Based on available evidence, it seems inevitable that EPA will conclusively 
engage in the discussion over hydraulic fracturing, if only nominally, particularly if 
President Obama is nominated for a second term.  A continued Obama White House 
assures EPA of significant political cover even if both the House and Senate proceed 
under Republican control, particularly in a lame-duck second term where controversial 
decisions become less difficult to make.  EPA’s legitimate grounds for concern, in my 
view, centers on two issues: 1) cross-state emission from hydraulic fracturing operations, 
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which should be subject to CAA and 2) surface disposal of formation waters, which may 
or may not be subject to race-to-the-bottom issues because of transport capabilities.  
4.4.1 Green Completions 
On the first point, on April 18, 2012, EPA issued its first-ever final rules on 
emissions from hydraulic fracturing operations under its CAA authority.  The final 
regulation tasks operators with reducing emissions of volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs) by capturing 95% of the natural gas that is currently allowed to escape. These so-
called “green completions” will be standard by 2015, allowing operators roughly two 
and a half years to phase in the technology (EPA Web, Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution 
Standards). EPA estimates each completion may save roughly 10,800 Mcf of natural gas 
that would otherwise escape to the atmosphere, and that number may climb higher as 
technology improves (Harvey 2012). Though industry and watchdog groups dispute the 
costs of the process, the charge that producers will actually profit appears feasible, given 
that the technology is mature and that the API endorsed the rule. Indeed, independent 
studies show that producers have significant potential profits to make, which is one of 
the reasons EPA was able to push it through.  It is important to note that four states 
(Texas, Wyoming, Montana and Colorado) already have green completion standards in 
place to varying degrees.  (Harvey 2012).   
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4.4.2 Surface water disposal 
With regard to more rigorous disposal rules, strides forward are still necessary; 
however, there is no reason why EPA cannot continue to cede primacy to the states in 
creation and execution of approved state implementation plans that are subject to EPA 
review. This is by no means a middling issue, but it has been heretofore addressed with 
NPDES (EPA Hydraulic Fracturing).  The critical distinction with respect to surface 
water disposal is that the historical program guidelines appear insufficient to assure the 
safe removal of NORMS and heavy metals.  Broadly speaking, there are many ways 
where EPA might assert its influence, exercise its budget, and foster the continued 
emergence of a stable industry that accomplishes the national aims of pursuing safe 
energy exploration without upending the existing model. 
4.5 Best practices recommendations 
A suite of recommendations for best practices might appear as follows: 
 Federal standards for flowback treatment, storage and transportation are likely, 
but they should be flexible and subject to state primacy per EPA review.  This 
leaves local regulatory structures in place and sovereign and allows them to 
leverage the knowhow, processes and personnel that would ensure no 
disruption to oversight.  It allows states with unique geologies that allow for 
deep well injection to continue the practice, which has been in place for decades.  
It precludes the EPA from assuming additional costs burdens which it already 
appears incapable of assuming. Lastly, it allows EPA to address potential cross-
state issues by requiring more rigorous standards for surface disposal, which 
though uncommon at this point still demands more stringent oversight. A 
reasonable analogue might be the SEC, responsible for regulating the financial 
industry.  Many have pointed to the impossible task of regulating such a 
complex and giant industry with a staff of 4,000: the maxim that the best policy 
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without capacity for enforcement is a needed reminder as officials contemplate 
significant, far-reaching and complex regulatory schemes.  In the absence of easy 
answers, it is apropos to consider possible avenues for low-hanging fruit or 
potentially easy solutions with big upside and low cost.   
 Another reasonable approach would be to have the federal government partially 
fund or shepherd the emergence of bifurcated state systems analogous to the 
response to the Minerals Management Service (MMS).  In the aftermath of the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill, the Department of Interior (DOI) elected 
to dissolve the MMS and create a new bureau, the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), which later split into 
two--the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety 
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE).  The division allowed BOEM to 
concentrate on policy issues like offshore leasing, resource evaluation, review 
and administration of oil and gas exploration and development plans, and other 
environmental policy tasks.  The BSEE, on the other hand, will handle 
enforcement and safety oversight, permitting, inspections and other enforcement 
related activities.  The split has the potential to isolate policy from enforcement, 
and could enable an environment where industry, rightfully, has the capacity to 
inform and educate policymakers while remaining separate from enforcement.  
State agencies such as the Railroad Commission in Texas and TCEQ operate on 
similar parallel tracks, fostering the necessary collaboration between industry 
knowledge and oversight while enabling objective review and safety checks on 
processes. 
 In a similar vein, EPA should foster growth of state geological surveys, some of 
whom handle regulatory issues for resource management within states, and 
many of whom work with the best information.  The Bureau of Economic 
Geology (BEG) in Texas, for example, is a key reason why the state’s oil and gas 
industry, as well as its oversight, is so strong today.  Furthermore, BEG has 
played a pivotal role in providing hydrogeological data to the state in the form of 
testimony and research. 
 State regulatory authorities should be proactive in demonstrating their 
autonomy by reviewing and strengthening conflict of interest issues; for 
example, in Texas, Railroad Commissioners are elected officials.  Though recusal 
rules are in place in event of a conflict, strengthening and review of asset 
divestitures, blind trust and conflict issues could go far in sending a proactive 
message. 
 Generate funds from industry to pay for data collation and analysis.  The 
tremendous amount of data stored in places like BEG (who houses all the 
geophysical logs for the Railroad Commission, for example) can be better 
leveraged by state water planning commissions. Can creative structures be 
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established through nominal taxes to ensure that research and publication 
persist?   
 Encourage support of organizations like Groundwater Protection Council and 
STRONGER (the State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental 
Regulations, which is jointly supported by EPA, DOE and the American 
Petroleum Institute).  These jointly supported, not-for-profit entities foment 
collaboration between industry and government (a good thing, if handled 
properly and subject to oversight).  Equally, if not more importantly, they offer 
the public an opportunity to view these contentious issues through third-party 
intermediaries who can proffer clarity and objectivity. 
 Commensurate with the second ninety-day report out of the DOE, insist that 
states compel producers to “measure and publicly report the composition of 
water stocks and flow throughout the fracturing and clean-up process.”  States 
should also require that listing the source of water throughout the process be a 
prerequisite. 
 Follow the example set by Arkansas and require companies to file  pre- and post- 
completion logs of chemicals planned for use and used in the frac.  This is similar 
to what Texas has enacted in its law. 
 Follow up on broader issues of energy-water interrelatedness.  As Nicot notes, 
no recent credible data exists that reflects water intensiveness of our various 
energy sources: coal, oil and gas, uranium, solar, wind, etc.  Put another way, we 
need comparative analyses of water efficiency to energy content. For its 2014 
report, EPA has outlined a number of study goals focusing on broad-ranging 
concerning fracking issues, such as well integrity during and after a frac, 
disposal methods and potential pitfalls, and subsurface chemistry changes that 
could affect transmissivity, among many (figure 3).  Interestingly, though, it also 
appears to forecast the need for water availability studies, and this kind of 
information could conceivably be very valuable to the states, where water 
availability issues are highly local.  On this last point, Texas could serve as an 
excellent proxy going forward on how energy production and water are 
interrelated, and how water availability should drive energy policy.  For this 
reason alone, it is critical that states maintain the flexibility and funding needed 





Chapter Five: Water and Hydraulic Fracturing in Texas: An Overview 
 
5.1 Water use estimates 
 
 Water availability for hydraulic fracturing may be a more critical question we 
need to be asking.  Federally-led research is bearing this out.  The US Geological 
Survey (USGS) is currently developing methods in the Bakken Shale in North 
Dakota to handle the most pressing questions associated with widespread hydraulic 
fracturing, and they have little to do with contamination.  TDS content of source 
water, how much water can be recycled safely, and when seasonally the water is 
needed, i.e. mapping demand to fit supply fluctuations, are the most pressing points 
of inquiry (Engle 2011).  Notably, these are largely issues of local concern.   
 Experts familiar with the Eagle Ford and Barnett Shales in Texas are already 
concentrating on water availability as the preeminent chokepoint for the state’s 
energy production and long-term water needs.  Some would argue that water 
availability is the key environmental concern to emerge from the fracking boom.  
These worries have sharpened locally against the backdrop of one of, if not the 
worst, droughts in recorded history.  Growing anecdotal accounts have emerged in 
local papers, frequently citing individual landowners whose water wells have gone 
steadily deeper in search of fresh water, as nearby fracking operations increase in 
scope and number.  In 2008, a lack of drilling in the Eagle Ford meant little 
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appreciable water use; the figure was more than 6,000 acre-feet by 2010 and expected 
to be close to 15,000 acre-feet in 2011 (Nicot presentation).  Fracking jobs are widely 
described as requiring 4-6 million gallons (roughly 12-18 acre-feet) per well in the 
Eagle Ford (Spruill, Nicot) though some stake that number even higher.  That 
number reflects the water needed for the actual frack, not spudding the well or other 
stages.  To a casual observer, these numbers seem high, but consider that Audubon 
International estimates the average American golf course uses 312,000 gallons/day, 
or about 0.95 acre-feet.  Variables such as staging crews and equipment, the number 
of lateral wells drilled, and the number of stages within those laterals varies from 
well to well or operator to operator, and these variations have profound impacts on 
water use.   Though water-use figures for single wells are not exorbitant, particularly 
compared to other industries like mining of aggregates or agriculture, there is some 
concern that on the whole these figures may pose significant challenges.  Researchers 
are looking for ways to measure more widespread impacts. In Texas, where 
comprehensive records do not exist, one method used by Nicot is to calculate the 
county area or area of the play and approximate the average spacing between 
laterals to find total lateral length.  Using a rate of intensity (gallons of water per foot 
of lateral), one divines a raw number that can be modified by qualifiers like recycling 
figures, number of available rigs, etc. (Nicot 2012). Though inexact, methods such as 
these have emerged as best credible guesses in the absence of widespread data 
collection.  Recent well counts in the Eagle Ford number one thousand forty active 
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wells, yielding an annual water use of 18 million m3, equaling roughly 14,600 acre-
feet, or 4.76*109 gallons (Nicot 2012).  That average yield is roughly 13 million 
gallons/day over the entire Eagle Ford play at the most recent year’s rate of 
production (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1. Map of wells permitted and completed in the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas as of March 2012, From 





5. 2 Price effects on exploration 
Exploration, and subsequently water use, is dependent on the price of gas; in 
today’s market, exploration will spike and continue with $10/Mcf gas and stall below 
$5/Mcf gas.  In other words, the intensity of exploration is driven by unpredictable 
externalities (Nicot).  In the last year, for example, oil production in Texas was up 6%, 
while natural gas production dropped down 16% in 2011 because of soft prices (Mills 
2012).  The number of oil rigs active in the play for the week of March 9, 2012 was 273, 
an all-time high, while the count for gas rigs was at 72, an all-time low for the region.  
These numbers, wholly reflective of oil and gas prices, belie the challenge for water 
managers in forecasting future usage.   
5.3 Future Exploration 
The Texas Railroad Commission has publicly stated their position that current 
water supplies are adequate (David Porter’s comments Jan 26, 2012) and even taken the 
position that depressed prices on natural gas will maintain steady downward pressure 
on the need for water: “the Eagle Ford will change the supply and demand equation (so 
drastically that) water issues won’t materialize because of the impact on supply” 
(Johnson 2012).  This approach seemingly contradicts a simple law of hydrocarbon 
exploration, namely, that the number of producing wells must always increase to 
maintain or grow aggregate production, since on the whole output declines over time.  
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According to Nicot, production in the Eagle Ford will climax in 2024, suggesting that 
industry’s water needs will continue to grow even as water supplies become more and 
more scarce. 
Broadly speaking, it is fair to ascertain that future recovery of natural gas will focus on 
non-traditional resources; as Daniel Yergin explains in The Quest, today’s 
unconventional fuels are tomorrow’s conventional resources; that is, there will always 
be more exploration.  Furthermore, markets capitalize on the cheapest production first, 
meaning that we should expect future production to require increasingly intensive 
processes, and that includes water.   Rex Tillerson of Exxon averred recently that 
exploration in Poland and in places like China has to date been unresponsive to fracking 
methods employed.  Already, engineers are looking at different fluids, proppants and 
methods to successfully permeate new formations, experimenting with CO2, foams and 
propane, for example (FuelFix Mar 18).  Predicting where water use rates will go is 
exceptionally fraught with uncertainty.  Just as water intensiveness of production may 
rise, it is held in check, by the price of gas, technology breakthroughs, competition for 
resources, cost of production increases and other factors.  Nevertheless, increased 
production in these harder-to-produce formations will likely require new resources.  
5.3.1 Water Recycling and High TDS Water 
Efforts are underway to improve water recycling methods.  Numbers on reuse 
improvements vary dramatically, ranging from 30% over a twelve-month period 
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(Moorhead 2011) to claims of 100% (Ely 2012).  The meaning of these numbers is unclear, 
and without context lacks significant thrust to suggest anything truly substantive.  One 
issue is that producers and regulators are too lax or imprecise when it comes to water 
origins, and freshwater, brackish water and saline groundwater all offer dramatically 
different value.  The use of brackish groundwater is on the rise, and calls for use of 
increasingly saline groundwater—water that could not otherwise be used for beneficial 
use at today’s price point—are increasing (Figure 5.3).  Technology will continue to 
search for ways to create systems that are resistant to high TDS without an appreciable 
decline in efficiency.  
 
Figure 5.3. Retention pond for brackish groundwater pumped from a water well at EOG 
Resources.  The pond holds roughly 40 acre-feet of water—enough to frack roughly three wells-- 
that will be pumped into trucks for use at the wellpad.  The poly liner will create an impermeable 




 Some producers have complained that use of higher TDS waters in frack gel 
involves a less-than-optimal effect on the proppant, and thus reduces the effectiveness of 
the frack (Moorhead 2011), others cite the growing trend offshore in using seawater 
(TDS 30,000-40,000 ppm) for fracking, which indicates that industry is learning quite 
quickly how to make use of potential resources, irrespective of the challenges (Holditch 
2012). This trend may also reveal an unfortunate fact: that when low-cost water remains 
readily available, industry will use it—until forced otherwise.     
5.4 Texas Groundwater Conservation Districts 
Texas’ existing case law and regulation is ill-equipped to handle the conflicts 
arising from water demand in the oil and gas industry and beyond.  The indirect effects 
of legal water groundwater pumping, for example, suggest difficult claims for 
landowners whose wells must be drilled ever-deeper to keep apace with drawdown or 
the possibility that over pumping could lead to saltwater or chemical intrusion.  The 
recent Texas Supreme Court ruling in the Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day/McDaniel 
case reinforced the strength of landowner’s claims to groundwater rights, making these 
projections even more difficult.  At the time of writing, the perceived 
weakening/leavening of a groundwater conservation district’s (GCD) capacity to 
regulate pumping, thereby potentially infringing on an owner’s groundwater rights, has 
cast the future potency of GCD permitting structures themselves in doubt.  Moreover, 
GCDs across the state enjoy vastly variable levels of funding.  Most are ill-equipped to 
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deal with rigorous permitting or regulatory regimes, and observers point out that the 
recent ruling puts them at even greater disadvantage in litigation matters, as they will be 
ill-equipped to withstand any taking claims, particularly from seemingly well-funded 
interests like oil and gas (Brown 2012). Though the RRC requires that water volumes 
associated with fracking must be disclosed, water for oil and gas exploration is exempt 
from pumping constraints levied by the GCDs in Texas according to Texas Water Code 
section 36.117 (Texas RRC web).  Whether fracking will be subject to those same 
pumping constraints is a question of legal and regulatory uncertainty, and some GCDs 
are permitting unlimited withdrawals for fracking, despite the uncertain language 
(Brown 2012).  As long as the language remains unclear, it seems that the specter of 
litigation will be a formidable deterrent to any ambitious GCD aiming to control 
pumping. 
Furthermore, these GCDs may be staffed or controlled by local stakeholders 
whose mineral rights or landholdings make it difficult to balance the conflict of interest 
in negotiating local water availability needs with potential personal windfalls generated 
by the minerals they hold.  This combination of regulatory impotency, lack of funds and 
potential conflict suggests that withdrawal issues will be under- or improperly regulated 
in the near term and suggest a more viable long-term solution, perhaps at the 
Groundwater Management Area (GMA) level or higher at the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ).   
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5.5 Railroad Commission Disclosure Recommendations 
For this reason, the Texas RRC can and should once again assert its leadership in 
the field.  Disclosure forms like the G-1, which are filed at completion, should include 











It should also encourage fracfocus.org to do same, listing surface water and 
groundwater splits, precise source and TDS.   RRC should look for creative ways to 
compel producers to use brackish and saline water, whether through statute, tax 
incentives or collaboration with local stakeholders.  The speed with which it maps well 
data on www.fracfocus.org has also been criticized as too slow for local landowners to 
file protest; to countermand these criticisms it should improve outreach and expedite 




Chapter Six: Conclusions 
On Saturday, April 28, the director of EPA’s Region Six, Al Armendariz, formally 
resigned his post effective April 30, 2012, in the wake of reports in which he used the 
word “crucify” to describe his approach to dealing with violators of environmental law 
(Cappiello 2012).  As the director of the region that oversaw the Range emergency order, 
Armendariz had drawn ire from pro-drilling advocates who viewed his directorship as 
overly politicized and ideologically driven.  The resignation was likely viewed from 
within EPA as a needed precaution against drawing additional criticism from domestic 
energy advocates during an election year.  In other words, it was considered a political 
maneuver to prevent further debasement of the national EPA at the expense of an 
unpopular local director.  The episode underscores the challenges ahead for industry 
and EPA.  The politics surrounding hydraulic fracturing have obfuscated the scientific 
data from the outset, and will continue to do so if EPA, industry and state regulators do 
not collaborate.  Industry and regulators must focus on science-based regulation and 
abandon sovereignty battles and zealotry to refocus on how best to address oversight 
and how to regain the public trust, which has been lost.  “Macro” issues, such as 
shepherding the emergence of robust EPA-approved state regulatory regimes, fostering 
applied research, and restoring public faith in the public-private dynamic should be a 
focus.  The emergence of internet tools and public databases can usher in greater 
transparency for regulators, provided data is collated and analyzed in meaningful ways.  
Here, state geological surveys, water development boards and other agencies can offer 
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critical insight into future challenges.  States should prioritize funding these kinds of 
engagements, and EPA can play a role in encouraging those initiatives.  Lastly, EPA, the 
states and industry should welcome the continued prominence of objective, empirically-
driven organizations like Groundwater Protection Council, who have established a 
history of working within the federalist model of environmental sovereignty.  Lastly, 
and most controllably, all sides should take pains to depoliticize the issues for the sake 
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